SPEECH

Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368 (1931) (“It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech.”), citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 371, 373 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927).

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (“For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and of the press — which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by Congress — are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States,” but rejecting the objection); id., at 672 (Holmes, J., joined by Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The general principle of free speech, it seems to me, must be taken to be included in the Fourteenth Amendment, in view of the scope that has been given to the word ‘liberty’ as there used, although perhaps it may be accepted with a somewhat larger latitude of interpretation than is allowed to Congress by the sweeping language that governs or ought to govern the laws of the United States.”)

PRESS

Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931) (“It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty of the press and of speech is within the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by state action.  It was found impossible to conclude that this essential personal liberty of the citizen was left unprotected by the general guaranty of fundamental rights of person and property.”), citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 362, 373 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380, 382 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)

Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (see quotation above)

ASSEMBLY

De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (“Freedom of speech and of the press are fundamental rights which are safeguarded by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.  Gitlow v. New York, supra, p. 666; Stromberg v. California, supra, p. 368; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243, 244.  The right of peaceable assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fundamental.”)

See also NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (“Effective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and assembly.  De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364; Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530.  It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.  See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324; Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321.”)

PETITION

Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 235 (1963) (“And it is clear to us that in arresting, convicting, and punishing the petitioners under the circumstances disclosed by this record, South Carolina infringed the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights of free speech, free assembly, and freedom to petition for redress of their grievances.  [¶]  It has long been established that these First Amendment freedoms are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment from invasion by the States.”) (citations omitted)

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.”) (footnote omitted)

See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (“The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for communication of views on national questions . . . must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1876) (recognizing that one attribute of national citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s privileges-or-immunities clause is “[t]he right of the people peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the powers or the duties of the National Government”) (emphasis added)

FREE EXERCISE

Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (“We hold that the statute, as construed and applied to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty without due process of law in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment.  The fundamental concept of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.  [Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147.]  The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.  The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws.”) (footnote omitted)

Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 261–62 (1934) (“Appellants assert — unquestionably in good faith — that all war, preparation for war, and the training required by the University are repugnant to the tenets and discipline of their church, to their religion, and to their consciences.  . . . .  There need be no attempt to enumerate or comprehensively to define what is included in the ‘liberty’ protected by the due process clause.  Undoubtedly it does include the right to entertain the beliefs, to adhere to the principles, and to teach the doctrines on which these students base their objections to the order prescribing military training.  Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399; Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510; Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 368, 369; Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707.”; but rejecting the objections)

ESTABLISHMENT

Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (“[Respondents] argue that historically the First Amendment was intended to forbid only government preference of one religion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all religions.  In addition they ask that we distinguish or overrule our holding in the Everson case that the Fourteenth Amendment made the ‘establishment of religion’ clause of the First Amendment applicable as a prohibition against the States.  After giving full consideration to the arguments presented we are unable to accept either of these contentions.”)

Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947) (“The First Amendment, as made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, commands that a state ‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .’,” but rejecting the objection)

See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)